We investigate the role of spatial frictions in search equilibrium unemployment. For that, we develop a model of the labour market in which workers' location in an agglomeration depends on commuting costs, the endogenous price of land and the value of job search and employment. After showing the existence of a unique and stable market equilibrium in which the unemployed workers reside far away from jobs, we investigate the role of spatial frictions in the interaction between housing and labour markets. In particular, we explicit the causal links between these two markets and decompose the equilibrium unemployment rate into two parts: a pure non-spatial one (which corresponds to the standard matching model) and a mixed of non-spatial and spatial elements, the first part amplifying the second one. Then, by endogeneizing job search efforts, we show that long and short-term unemployed workers emerge and locate in different part of the city. Finally, we derive some welfare implications by demonstrating that, despite additional search externalities, the usual Hosios condition holds in the absence of distortions in the transport market.
Introduction
It has been recognized for a long time that distance interacts with the diffusion of information.
In his seminal contribution to search, Stigler (1961) puts geographical dispersion as one of the four immediate determinants of price ignorance. The reason is simply that distance affects various costs associated with search. In most search models, say for example Diamond (1982) , distance between agents or units implies a fixed cost of making another draw in the distribution. In other words, a spatial dispersion of agents creates more frictions and thus more unemployment. Conventional labour economics faces difficulties to think about these spatial differences because it is biased towards the notion of a spaceless marketplace ruled by the walrasian auctioneer. This is a weakness of the analysis since empirical evidence support the idea of a clear spatial dimension of the labour markets (see for example the recent survey of Crampton, 1999) . There are in fact several channels through which space affects the labour market.
First, workers who live further away from jobs may have poorer labour market information and be less productive than those living closer to jobs (Seater, 1979) . This is particularly true for younger and/or less-skilled workers who rely heavily on informal search methods for obtaining employment (Holzer, 1987) . 1 The reliance on these informal methods of job search suggests that information on available job opportunities may decay rapidly with the distance from home (Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist, 1990) . Second, distance also implies higher commuting costs for the unemployed, which directly affects the search process (Van Ommeren et al., 1997). Third, workers residing too far away from jobs may quit their job more frequently because of too long commuting distances (Zax and Kain 1996) . Finally, employers may discriminate against applicants living in remote areas (Zenou and Boccard, 2000) . As a result it is commonly observed that unemployment rates differ strongly across as well as within local labour markets (see e.g. Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994 , Martson, 1985 , Topa, 2001 ).
The interaction between space and labour markets is thus complex. We have divided our research questions into two parts. In a companion paper (Wasmer and Zenou, 2002) , the focus 1 In Holzer (1988) , it is shown that among 16-23 years old workers who reported job acceptance, 66% used informal search channels (30% direct application without referral and 36% friends/relatives), while only 11% using state agencies and 10% newspapers.
was mainly urban and we have thus explicitly studied all the possible urban configurations in a job-matching framework. We have in particular shown how a public transportation policy strongly depends on which type of urban equilibrium prevails.
The aim of the present paper is to focus instead on the labour market aspects of urban equilibria. To this purpose, we focus on the most relevant urban equilibria of Wasmer and Zenou (2002) , the one in which the unemployed reside far away from jobs. Within this urban equilibrium, we systematically explore the role of space, and notably the spatial dimension of search. We have more specifically two questions in mind: does the efficiency results of the decentralized search equilibria (Lucas and Prescott 1974, Moen 1997 ) still hold when the spatial dispersion of agents creates frictions? And does the search equilibrium strongly depends on these spatial terms? Our answers are yes and yes.
In our approach, the allocation of jobs and workers is a time-consuming process and the number of matches per unit of time between workers and open vacancies is represented by an aggregate matching function (à la Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides). Even if firms pay workers their reservation wage, there is still a level of durable unemployment in the area (due to stochastic rationing not being eliminated by price adjustment). However, in this line of search models, the spatial dimension is often implicit. Here, we explicitly introduce it by considering that the distance between workers' residential locations and jobs plays an adverse role in the formation of a match. In this respect, our model can be viewed as a natural extension of the standard matching model. The land market will be kept rather simple in order to provide closed-form solutions. We consider a closed piece of land (that can be thought as an urban area, a city, an agglomeration or a region). This area is monocentric, i.e., firms are exogenously located in an employment center and workers consume inelastically one unit of space. In our analysis, local factors (rental price, distance to the employment center) and global factors (labour market tightness, wages) influence workers' location decisions, i.e. the land market equilibrium. Within this framework, we can have different land market equilibria. We only focus here on the equilibrium in which the unemployed reside further away from the employment center.
We then derive the labour market equilibrium in which spatial unemployment is due to frictions in the labour market. On the one hand, the land market equilibrium depends on aggregate variables (such as wages and labour market tightness) since these variables affect location choices of workers. On the other hand, the labour market equilibrium crucially depends on the land market equilibrium configuration. Indeed, the efficiency of aggregate matching depends on the average location of the unemployed.
We show that there exists a unique and stable market equilibrium in which both land and labour markets are solved for simultaneously. When comparing this decentralized equilibrium to a social planner's optimum, we find that distortions (subsidies or imperfect competition in the transport market) may modify the usual Hosios efficiency condition, but in absence of such distortions, and despite spatial terms in wages, the standard condition holds: an efficient spatial search equilibrium may thus occur.
We then show that space has an important role on the interaction between land and labour markets. We notably decompose the equilibrium unemployment rate into two parts: a pure non-spatial one (which corresponds to the standard matching model) and a mixed of non-spatial and spatial elements, the first element amplifying the other one. In other words, space adds to search frictions in the labour market by making the access to jobs more difficult. Finally, in endogeneizing the job search efforts, we show that long and short-term unemployed workers emerge and locate in different part of the city.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model and its notations. In section 3, we first study the land market (partial) equilibrium, the labour market (partial) equilibrium and finally the general equilibrium. Section 4 shows the different roles of space in the determination of equilibrium unemployment and its efficiency. Section 5 analyzes the case when search effort is endogenous. Finally, section 6 concludes.
The setup
Firms and workers are all (ex ante) identical and the labour force is normalized to 1. It follows that the unemployment rate u is equal to the unemployment level. A firm can be in two distinct states : either associated with a worker whose production is y units of output or unproductive in absence of a suitable worker. To find that suitable worker, the firm posts a vacancy. The rate per unit of time at which the vacancy is filled is constant over time, i.e. follows a random Poisson process. Symmetrically, workers searching for a job will meet a vacancy a constant rate according to another Poisson process. The two processes are governed according to a matching function determining the total number of contacts per unit of time: 2 h(su, V )
V denotes the number of vacancies. Individual workers i have an heterogenous search efficiency of search equal to s i determined hereafter. Accordingly, the notation s represents the average efficiency of search of the unemployed workers. Since s represents the aggregate search frictions, it is also an index of aggregate information about economic opportunities.
As usual, h(.) is assumed to be increasing both in its arguments, concave and exhibits constant returns to scale. The probability for a vacancy to be filled per unit of time is then
, and using the constant return to scale assumption, it can be written as:
where θ = V/us is a measure of labour market tightness in efficiency units and q(θ) is a
Poisson intensity. It is easily verified that q 0 (θ) ≤ 0: the greater the labour market tightness, the lower the probability for a firm to fill a vacancy.
Similarly, for a worker i with efficiency s i , the probability of obtaining a job per unit of time is:
where p i is defined as the intensity of the exit rate from unemployment. The deviation from the standard model of job matching (Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999, Pissarides, 2000) where there is no spatial dimension is the following: the search efficiency parameter s i depends on the location of the unemployed workers in the city. Further, it is assumed that, the closer the residential location to the workplace, the better the efficiency and the more likely is a contact
where d i is the location of the worker with s 0 (d i ) < 0). 3 Such a dependence of search on distance has several empirical supports. For instance, Barron and Gilley (1981) and Chirinko (1982) find evidences of diminishing returns to search when people live far away from jobs. Rogers (1997) also demonstrates that access to employment is a significant variable in explaining the probability of leaving unemployment.
2 This matching function is written under the assumption that all firms are located in one fixed location.
In section 3, we detail the spatial structure of the city. 3 In section 5, we relax this assumption but show that si and di are negatively related when search effort is affected by commuting costs.
We also assume that individual firms have no impact on their own search efficiency and consider s, u and V as given.
For analytical simplicity, we assume that:
with s 0 > 0 and a > 0. In this formulation, s 0 denotes the standard non-spatial search effort such as writing letters, buying newspapers ... while a represents the loss of information per unit of distance. In other words, when workers are further away from jobs, it is more difficult for them to have information about jobs than those who are located closer to jobs. In other words, a can be viewed as a measure of isolation of workers since, with a large a, living far away from jobs implies little information on jobs and thus a higher residential segregation
When a = 0, we are back to the standard non-spatial search model.
Once the match is made, the wage is determined by the generalized Nash bargaining solution. There is also a probability δ per unit of time that the match is destroyed. In order to determine the (general) equilibrium, we will proceed as follows. We first determine the partial land market equilibrium configuration. Then, depending on the location of workers and thus on the aggregate search efficiency s, we determine the partial labour market equilibrium.
Hereafter, by labour (respectively land market) equilibrium, it has to be understood the partial equilibrium. The general equilibrium involves two markets, and will be denominated a 'market equilibrium'.
By denoting by R(d) the land market price at a distance d from the city-center, by w the wage earned by workers and by u the unemployment rate, we have the following definition.
A market equilibrium is a 4-uple (R(d), w, θ, u) solved simultaneously for the land use equilibrium and the labour market equilibrium. We will give below more precise definitions of these two markets.
3 The equilibrium
The allocation of workers in space
We assume, as it is quite standard in urban economics (see e.g. Brueckner, 1987 or Fujita, 1989 , that the area is monocentric, i.e., all firms are assumed to be exogenously located in the employment center. The area is also linear, closed and landlords are absent. Workers will be uniformly distributed in space, and will decide about their optimal residence between the employment center and the fringe. In other words, all consume inelastically one unit of land. There are therefore exactly d units of housing within a distance d of the employment center which simplifies the analysis.
All workers incur a travel cost to the center. Let us denote by τ e d and τ u d the transportation cost at a distance d from the employment center for respectively working activities and unemployed specific activities (interviews, registration), with τ e > 0 and τ u > 0. They also pay the land rent costs at the market price R(d) determined later on, and receive a wage w when employed and unemployment benefits b if unemployed. We denote by U and W the expected discounted lifetime net income of the unemployed and the employed respectively.
We assume that location changes are costless 4 and further assume perfect financial markets.
With the Poisson probabilities defined above, infinitely-lived workers have then the following intertemporal utility functions:
where r is the exogenous discount rate. Let us comment (3). When a worker is unemployed today, he/she resides in d and his/her net income is b − τ u d − R(d). Then, he/she can get a job with a probability p(d) and if so, he/she relocates optimally in d 0 and obtains an increase
The interpretation of (4) is similar.
It is important to notice that, thanks to the assumption of no relocation costs, the equilibrium is such that all the unemployed enjoy the same level of utility rU = rU as well as the employed rW = rW . Indeed, any utility differential within the area would lead to the relocation of some workers up to the point where differences in utility disappear.
In order to solve the workers' location problem, let us introduce the concept of bid rents (Fujita, 1989) , which are defined as the maximum land rent at a distance d that each type of worker is ready to pay in order to reach his/her respective equilibrium utility level. The bid rents of the unemployed and employed are respectively given by:
The land use equilibrium R(d) is the upper envelop of all workers' bid rents and of the constant rent outside the city R A , (in equation
. See figure 1. As this figure shows, the slopes of their bid rents is important to determine the allocation of workers in space. Since s(d) is linear and given by (2), we have that p 00 (d) = 0. This implies that the bid rents are linear, i.e.
and we have:
where
The absolute value of the slopes are the marginal cost that a worker is ready to pay in order to be marginally closer to the employment center by one unit of space. Indeed, for the unemployed workers, that marginal cost is the sum of the marginal commuting cost, τ u , and the marginal probability of finding a job times the (intertemporal) surplus of being employed. For the employed workers, the marginal cost is simply the commuting costs equal to τ e : it has been assumed that the probability of losing a job δ does not depend on the location of workers 5 .
Depending on the relative slopes, only two land market equilibria are possible: either the unemployed reside in the vicinity of the employment center and the employed at the outskirts of the area or the unemployed locate at the outskirts of the area and the employed close to the center. In this paper, we focus only on the equilibrium where the unemployed are far away from jobs: we want to show how the spatial access to jobs matters for the labour market outcomes of workers, without needing the exploration of all land market equilibria.
The condition for this equilibrium occurs if that the slope of the bid rent of the employed exceeds that of the unemployed, that is:
This is quite intuitive: for the employed to occupy the core of the area, it must be that they bid away the unemployed. This condition states that the differential in commuting costs between the employed and the unemployed must be higher than the expected return for the unemployed of being more efficient in search by being marginally closer to the center. So, the resulting equilibrium is determined by a trade-off between the difference in commuting costs, τ e − τ u , and the marginal probability of finding a job.
Two remarks are in order : first, the condition (9) contains endogenous variables. We postpone to sub-section 3.3.1 the proofs that, once solved, it translates into a condition on parameters. Second, when the opposite inequality holds, we have a different urban configuration. This is not the focus of this labour paper but details are explored in Wasmer and
Zenou (2002).
By using the former definitions of the land market and (9), we are now able to formally define the land use equilibrium. If we denote the border between the unemployed and the employed by d b , we have the following. The land market equilibrium (U, W , d b ) is such that:
This equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 1 . The first two equations are the standard population constraints when density and housing consumption are equal to 1 everywhere in the area. Equations (11) and (12) guarantee that the land rent is continuous everywhere in the area. By using (5), (6), (10) and replacing them in (11) and (12), we obtain:
where w, u, θ will be determined at the labour market equilibrium and
The average efficiency intensity is equal to:
Figure 1: Bid rents and equilibrium rent, location of workers within a city.
In other words, it is increased by the constant part, and decreased by a higher distance from the center of the average unemployed worker. At a constant unemployment rate, it is decreased by the gradient parameter a.
The labour market

The entry of firms
Given our land market equilibrium, we can now define the labour market equilibrium and then, solve the general problem. Let us first have the following definition of a labour market equilibrium: A (steady-state) labour market equilibrium (w, θ, u) is such that, given the matching technology defined by (1), all agents (workers and firms) maximize their respective objective function, i.e. this triple is determined by a free-entry condition for firms, a wagesetting mechanism and a steady-state condition.
The first part of the labour block comes from a free-entry condition for firms, leading to the determination of labour demand. Let us denote by J and J V the intertemporal profit of a job and of a vacancy, respectively. If γ is the search cost for the firm per unit of time and y is the product of the match, then J and J V can be written as:
We assume that firms post vacancies up to a point where:
which is a free entry condition (Pissarides 2000) . From this free entry condition, we have the following decreasing relation between labour market tightness and wages:
The value of a job must in equilibrium be equal to the expected search cost, i.e. the cost per unit of time multiplied by the average duration of search for the firm. Equation (18) defines in the space (θ, w) the supply of vacancies (which is also a labour demand curve L d , independent of d b and is downward sloping in the plane (θ, w)). Because wages are endogenous, the effect of distance on the equilibrium unemployment will notably appear through commuting costs that affect wages. Let us now determine the endogenous level of wages in the economy.
Wages
Each period, the total surplus is shared between firms and workers through a generalized Nash-bargaining game. The total surplus is the sum of the surplus of the workers, W − U, and the surplus of the firms J. The wage is thus determined by :
It is important to remember that the threat point for the worker U does not depend on the current location of the worker: the latter would instantaneously relocate after a job separation. Further, the wage is set in each individual firm, so that ∂U ∂w = 0. The above sharing rule leads then to:
By using (4) and (17), we have:
One finally obtains using (19) to replace U by its general equilibrium value : where the rent difference between an employed and an unemployed agent vanishes). This is referred to as the compensation effect. 6 The second part of the additional term is −αad b θγ.
It involves both spatial and labour elements. Indeed, when d b increases, the unemployed worker who is the closest from jobs (the one situated at d b = 1 − u) is even less close to jobs (spatial element) and thus has a lower search efficiency (labour element). The employed workers' outside option then decrease, which implies a reduction in wages. This is referred to as the spatial outside option effect.
One can notice that, at constant θ,
The overall net effect is thus ambiguous. However, using the condition that guarantees that our urban equilibrium prevails (see condition (23) below), it is easy to see that ∂w ∂u < 0. We thus have a negative relationship between local wages and unemployment. This is consistent with the empirical evidence on local wage curves by Blanchflower and Oswald (1994) and Topel (2001).
The general equilibrium
Existence of equilibrium
Using w and θ, the condition (9) that ensures that the land market equilibrium always exists and is unique can be rewritten as: 7
The intuition of this condition is straightforward: when the difference in commuting costs, τ e − τ u , is large and/or when the loss of information per unit of distance, a, is small and/or the search cost of firms, γ, is small, and/or the workers' bargaining strength, α, is low, then the employed bid away the unemployed at the periphery of the city.
Combining (18) and (21), one can eliminate the wage and obtain a relation between θ and u as follows (recalling that d b = 1 − u):
Using (23), it is easy to check that this relation is positive. 8 We can now close the model by providing another relation between θ and u. This relation is given by the existence of a steady-state condition on flows:
which is equivalent to:
This is a negative relation between θ and u. Given equation (24) , the existence and uniqueness of θ and u is established in Lemma A1 in Appendix 1. 9
Furthermore, since the wage setting curve described by (21) is linear in θ and positively sloped and the free entry condition (17) implies a decreasing relation between labour market tightness and wages, we thus have two unique relations θ(u) and w(u). Denote further by θ * and u * these equilibrium values, and w * = w(u * ). We can now offer a more precise condition on parameters :
Proposition 1 When the parameters are such that θ * < l, then, there exists a unique market equilibrium (R(d), θ * , u * , w * ) in which the unemployed reside far away from jobs and the employed close to jobs.
The main result here is that the equilibrium labour market tightness, θ * must be lower than a threshold value l (defined as a function of parameters; see (23) ) for the land market 8 Furthermore, since the wage setting curve described by (21) is linear in θ and positively sloped and the free entry condition (17) implies a decreasing relation between labour market tightness and wages, we thus have two unique relations θ(u) and w(u). 9 All lemmas are stated and proved in Appendix 1.
configuration described in Figure 1 to exist. The proof of this result is much easier to expose when considering all possible cases (θ * < l and θ * > l). It however requires several pages to be done rigorously. It is available in Wasmer and Zenou (2002) or available upon request from a technical appendix.
The Beveridge curve
There is another more intuitive way of representing the equilibrium: in the u − V space. As stated above, equation (18) determines a value of θ = V/(us) that gives a relation between V and u. This is an upward sloping curve in the u − V space called the V S curve (see Lemma A2 in Appendix 1). Furthermore, equation (25) can be rewritten as:
we obtain the so-called Beveridge curve UV . Its properties are given in Lemma A3 in Appendix 1. The interesting feature of this Beveridge curve is that it is indexed by s, which depends on the spatial dispersion of the unemployed: a lower s is associated with an outward shift of Beveridge curve in the u − V space because more vacancies are needed to maintain the steady-state level of unemployment. If a increases or s 0 decreases, the Beveridge curve is shifted away from the origin meaning that the labour market is less efficient. We turn to these questions in greater detail in the next section.
4 The role of space in the theory of unemployment
Interaction between land and labour markets
The interaction between land and labour market is partly due to the dependence of search efficiency on distance. To show that, we proceed a contrario: we assume first that wages are exogenous and a = 0, and in this case, both markets equilibria are independent. When we relax exogenous wages and keep a = 0, there is a one-way interaction between markets: the labour market does not depend on the land market.
Finally, as soon as a > 0, one has a general equilibrium interaction between the markets.
We could already guess the dependence of the labour market to the land market from the fact that the Beveridge curve, defined by equation (27) , depends on s. and thus on the average distance of the unemployed to jobs.
Indeed, one of the key assumption of our model is that the search efficiency s i of each worker i depends on the distance between residence and the job-center, i.e., s i = s i (d) with
This implies that the land and labour markets are interdependent. Indeed, on the one hand, the labour market strongly depends on the land market since the equilibrium values of u * , V * and θ * depend on the value of s. On the other hand, the land market strongly depends on the labour market since the inequality (9) determining the land market equilibrium configuration, θ * < l, depends on the value of θ * .
To evaluate the implications of this relation s i (d), let us assume that s i is independent of d (a = 0 so that s = s 0 ) but workers still locate in the city and thus bear land rents and commuting costs. In this context, the inequality (9) reduces to t e − t u > 0. In other words, the land market equilibrium is independent of the labour market equilibrium. The location choices of the employed and the unemployed, which depend on the slopes of the bid rents, involve only transportation costs. So, since t u < t e , the unemployed reside at the outskirts of the city, irrespective of the labour market equilibrium outcome. When wages are exogenous, we do not have anymore equation (21) but instead w = w. So, the equilibrium is defined by two equations, (18) and (25) in which w = w. Therefore, when wages are exogenous, the equilibrium unemployment and vacancy rates would be exactly the same as in the standard non-spatial matching models (see e.g. Pissarides, 1990 ) and s = s 0 is independent of the land use equilibrium. On the contrary, when the wage is a result of a bargaining between workers and firms, the main difference with the standard non-spatial matching model is that commuting costs affect wages. We can summarize our discussion by the following table. 
Decomposition of unemployment
We pursue our analysis of the importance of space in equilibrium unemployment by determining the part of unemployment only due to spatial frictions. Let us start with exogenous wages. In this case, θ is constant and determined by (18) . By using (26) , the unemployment rate is given by:
Let us further define by:
the part of unemployment that is independent of spatial frictions, i.e. when a = 0 so that s 0 = s 0 . By a Taylor first-order expansion for small a/s 0 , we easily obtain:
is the unemployment that is only due to spatial frictions and u 0 is defined by (29). Observe that u s is increasing in a/s 0 , the parameter representing the loss in information through distance and null when a = 0. Observe also that the pure frictional unemployment u 0 affects u s in the following way:
In general u 0 < 0.42 so that u 0 affects positively u s , showing the full interaction between land and labour markets. This is quite natural: higher 'spaceless' unemployment u 0 affects positively frictions due to spatial heterogeneity (this is a side-effect of the dispersion of space on the unemployed themselves, which increases the average distance to jobs).
Under endogenous wage setting, a larger set of parameters determines the spatial component of unemployment. First, the endogenous wage w defined by (21) can be decomposed into three parts:
where w 0 = (1 − α)b + α(y + s 0 θγ) is the wage that would receive workers if all agents were located in the same point, w τ = (1 − α)(τ e − τ u )(1 − u) reflects the impact of distance on transportation costs and thus on wages, and w a = α a (1 − u)θγ the fact that search efficiency varies with distance to jobs (this was called the 'outside option effect' of distance in the previous section). By using a Taylor expansion, one could also decompose θ in different parts, thus further decomposing the spatial part of unemployment into three parts itself.
This is a bit involving for just finding a decomposition looking exactly as the decomposition of wages.
The conclusion is that, compared to the non-spatial case, unemployment increases because of the loss of information due to spatial dispersion of agents and also because of the wage compensation of commuting costs. However, it also tends to decrease because of the outside option effect that reduces wages.
Welfare analysis
Having derived the equilibrium in each market, one can now proceed to the welfare analysis.
For that, we need to define the structure of transport cost and to introduce a new agent:
the transportation firm (that may be private or public). Let us denote by c e and c u the (exogenous) marginal cost of transportation of respectively the employed and the unemployed and by −1 < ψ < +∞ the mark-up over the marginal cost. We thus have:
For simplicity and to illustrate how the (in-)efficiency of this economy depends on ψ, we do not model its determination and thus treat ψ as a parameter. If transportation is subsidized, then ψ < 0 whereas if the transportation firm has some market power ψ > 0. Finally, when prices are equal to their marginal cost so that profits are equal to zero, ψ = 0. In this context, the social welfare for an infinitely-lived social planner is given by the sum of the utilities of workers, the profit of firms net of search costs, the land rent of landlords and the net profit of the transportation firm. We have:
Observe that the wage w as well as the land rent R(.) cancel out in the social welfare function because they are pure transfers. Observe also that b is considered here as the value of leisure for the unemployed. We obtain the following result.
Proposition 2 The private and the social outcomes coincide only when:
which is the standard Hosios-Pissarides condition extended to a spatial framework.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
Observe that, in general, nothing guarantees that the private outcome is efficient. This is a standard result in search theory due to search externalities. In the literature, a competitive search equilibrium is a situation in which the standard Hosios condition α = η(θ) holds (see Hosios, 1990 , Moen, 1997, Mortensen and Pissarides 1999, Pissarides, 2000, ch.8). Indeed, in the spaceless model, when α is larger than η(θ), there is too much unemployment, creating congestion in the matching process for the unemployed. When α is lower than η(θ), there is too little unemployment, creating congestion for firms.
Observe also that the existence of spatial terms modifies the standard Hosios condition.
Here, the condition α = η(θ) that guarantees that the market solution is efficient in a nonspatial matching framework is augmented by a term incorporating some spatial aspects.
Hereafter, we call a spatially efficient search equilibrium a situation in which the efficiency condition (32) holds. To interpret these additional terms, let us first discuss the conditions on parameters that modify or validate the standard Hosios-Pissarides condition.
As a straightforward corollary, efficiency requires that: α < η(θ) when transport prices are above their marginal cost, i.e. ψ > 0; α > η(θ) when transport prices are below their marginal cost, i.e. ψ < 0; α = η(θ) when transport prices equal their marginal cost, i.e.
The following comments are in order. First, the social planner cares about transport costs (c e and c u ) whereas the decentralized equilibrium only involves transport prices (τ e and τ u faced by workers). When ψ = 0 (case (iii)), both are equal and the social planner only cares about the internalization of search-matching externalities. This precisely corresponds to the constrained efficient search equilibrium. 10 Second, if ψ 6 = 0, transport spending in the decentralized equilibrium are not optimal.
Notably, when ψ > 0, the transport costs in the decentralized economy are below the optimum whereas when ψ < 0, the transport costs in the decentralized economy are above the optimum.
Since, given inequality (9) in our configuration, we necessarily have c e > c u , a larger number of employed workers in the economy is associated with larger commuting costs. Thus, a 10 Note that case (iii) may also hold is a degenerate case, when the transport cost differential between the employed and the unemployed is zero i.e. ce = cu, which, given inequality (9), is possible only if a = 0. In such a case, the inequality (9) is binding and the slopes of bid rents of the employed and unemployed are equal: the location of the agents is thus undeterminated. Note also that when the spatial ingredients of the model disappear, a = 0, and ce = cu = 0, one naturally obtains the standard efficiency condition α = η(θ).
higher α, implying higher wages, reduces employment and thus reduces transports spending.
Accordingly, efficiency in the case ψ > 0 requires a higher level of employment to increase transports spending, i.e. when α is lower than what is required to internalize the search-matching externalities. Similarly, efficiency in the case ψ < 0 requires a lower level of employment to reduce transports spending, i.e. when α is higher than what is required to internalize the search-matching externalities. More generally, if ψ → 0, we obtain the spaceless Hosios-Pissarides efficiency condition even though spatial elements remain.
Long term unemployed and space
In this section, we discuss the link between the location of workers to their labour market outcomes. In our model, the unemployed who live further away from jobs experience longer unemployment spells than those residing closer to jobs. This result stems from the assumption that search efficiency depends negatively on distance. Here, we derive this relation from more primitive assumptions about search effort. In addition, by doing so, we introduce two classes of unemployed workers: the long run and short run unemployed workers.
Each individual's search efficiency s i now depends only on his/her effort e. We assume decreasing returns to scale to effort, i.e., s 0 (e) > 0 and s 00 (e) ≤ 0. As above, each interview is carried out in the employment center and thus involves transport costs. We denote by C u (e, d) the search costs associated with a level of effort e for a worker living at a distance d from the employment center. 11 We assume that the search commuting cost is an increasing and convex function of the effort level e devoted to job search, i.e., ∂C u /∂e > 0 and ∂ 2 C u /∂ 2 e ≥ 0, and that, quite naturally, ∂ 2 C u /∂e∂d > 0: the search effort marginally costs more further away from jobs. There is therefore a trade-off between search costs and returns associated with a higher probability to exit from unemployment. There is therefore a trade-off between search costs and returns associated with a higher probability to exit from unemployment. We have therefore the following proposition.
Proposition 3 When workers choose their effort, their search efficiency and thus their probability of obtaining a job decreases with the distance to jobs.
Proof : See Appendix 3.
The intuition of this result is as follows. When choosing their optimal level of effort, the unemployed workers equalize their marginal gain (which is the probability generated by 11 In the previous sections, the assumption of costs was Cu(e, d) = τ u d.
one more interview times the surplus when leaving unemployment) and their marginal loss (which is the marginal commuting cost of searching for a job). Then, because search effort marginally costs more further away from jobs, individuals search less in remote places and thus their probability to find a job decreases with distance to jobs.
Observe that (2) is not true anymore since, according to (38) in Appendix 3, the relation between search efficiency s(.) and distance d is not linear. This implies in particular that the unemployed workers' bid rent is not anymore linear but convex. Therefore, a new land market configuration can emerge in which the unemployed reside both at the vicinity of the employment center and at the outskirts of the city and the employed living in between the unemployed (see Figure 2) . In this case, even though all the unemployed enjoy the same utility level, the ones who reside close to the employment center experience short unemployment spells (the short-run unemployment level is denoted by u sr )because their search efficiency is very high whereas those who live further away are long term unemployed (whose level is given by u lr ) since their probability to find a job is quite low. In fact, the trade off is quite clear. We can also analyze the interaction between space and equilibrium unemployment. Denote the urban configuration described in Figure 1 by equilibrium 1 and the one described in Figure   2 by equilibrium 2. Then, by assuming for simplicity that wages are exogenous (θ 1 = θ 2 = θ), the unemployment rate in equilibrium k = 1, 2 is given by:
Thus, the only spatial interaction in unemployment is reflected through:
where z replaces distance in the integral for notational convenience. Assume s(e) = e σ , with σ < 1/2 for reasons that will become clear below, and that C(e, d) = τ u (e).d = (τ 0u + τ u .e)d.
By using (37) in Appendix 3, we easily obtain:
Employed Long-term unemployed Short-term unemployed One can see that σ < 1/2 allows us to integrate s(e) between 0 and any number. Focusing on the urban equilibrium in which the all unemployed reside far away from jobs (equilibrium 1), we obtain:
Space has an impact on s through the parameter α u which is the cross-derivative of the cost function for the unemployed, i.e. 1−σ which, as before, reflects the average distance between unemployed workers and jobs. Equilibrium 2 with endogenous search intensity is also interesting since we have: where u sr and u lr are the short run and long run unemployment rates respectively. In s 2 , the last term represents the spatial dispersion of short-term and long-term unemployed, both contributing much more to higher aggregate search efficiency.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have modelled the important interaction between the spatial dispersion of economic agents and the imperfection in information about economic opportunities. We have first demonstrated that there exists a unique and stable market equilibrium in which both land and labour markets are solved for simultaneously. We have then shown that the market equilibrium is in general not efficient because of both search and spatial elements, but that without distortions on the transport market, a spatial efficient equilibrium may hold if the usual Hosios-Pissarides condition holds. We have investigated how space affects search by focussing on the interaction between land and labour markets. We have explored the mechanics of causality from the labour market to the land market and reciprocally, and further decomposed unemployment into a spatial part and a spaceless part. Finally, we have seen that when distance and search effort are complement in the cost function of individuals, long-term and short-term unemployed endogenously emerge and locate in very different location within a city. 
In order to see if the private and social solutions coincide, we compare (24) and (35) and obtain the result of the proposition.
